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DISSERTATION
"Terror
and Mystery": The United States and Fear of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 1900-1945
My dissertation is a study of how the United States government reacted to the
emerging threat of nuclear attack, from Albert Einstein's 1905 declaration that
matter and energy were just different forms of the same thing (e=mc2) through
the end of the Second World War and the threat of Nazi nuclear weapons. Its table of contents:
 | Chapter 1: Introduction |
 | Chapter 2: Nuclear Fear and the Scientific Community, 1905-39 |
 | Chapter 3: Nuclear Fear and Hemispheric Defense, 1939-42 |
 | Chapter 4: Nuclear Fear and Victory in Europe, 1942-45 |
 | Chapter 5: Conclusion |
In a 1950 meeting with senior State and Defense Department officials,
Robert Oppenheimer (right) observed that "two things stand out sharply with reference
to the atomic bomb: one is terror and the other is mystery." For U.S.
political and military leaders, the "terror" was the prospect of
nuclear attack, and the "mystery" was just how close enemies and potential
enemies were to having an atomic bomb. Ensuring that no nuclear weapon
ever struck the United States or its armies overseas was one of the central
motivations of U.S. national security policy, not only after 1949, but during
the Second World War and in the early
post-war years as well.
Nuclear fission was discovered in Nazi Germany in 1938. The scientific
community succeeded with remarkable speed in drawing the attention of government
officials to this new danger, and by the time the United States entered the war,
many scientists and political leaders feared that Germany was already ahead in the world's first nuclear arms
race. By 1942, most British and American
leaders were confident of ultimate victory in the war; for those select few "in
the know," however, the atomic bomb was the one wild card that could change
everything. It is never easy to "prove a negative," but
by 1944 the absence of evidence of a massive German atomic program had eased
these fears
substantially. It was not until Allied armies entered Germany that Manhattan
Project officials knew for certain that they had not lost the race for the bomb. German surrender
left Japan as the sole combatant when the first
American atomic bombs became ready in early August 1945.
This is where the dissertation ends, and likely where the resulting
manuscript will end as well. It is by no means, however, the end of the
story of strategic defense during the Cold War (and beyond). For a
discussion of this, and other potential future subjects of research, see the
separate page on other research interests.
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